SignPath

Documentation Signing Docker images

Available for Enterprise and Open Source subscriptions

Overview

Docker Content Trust (DCT) is the system used for signing and verifying container images in Docker registries.

SignPath provides the following advantages when signing for DCT:

  • You don’t need to keep the target key (a powerful key without hardware protection option that you would otherwise need for every new developer)
  • Developers don’t need to keep their own delegation keys
  • You can use the full power of SignPath signing policies, including permission, approval, and origin verification
  • You can use all CI integration features of SignPath
  • Configuration and policy management is aligned with other signing methods, such as Authenticode or Java signing
  • SignPath maintains a full audit log of all signing activities
  • SignPath controls signing on a semantic level, where DCT would just verify signatures on manifest files (i.e. with SignPath, a signing request that claims to add a signature to a specific image and/or label can be trusted to do just that and nothing else)

DCT is based on Notary, which uses a system of keys:

Key type Handled by Used to Usage frequency Recommendation
Root Repository admin issue all other keys (except delegation keys) Initialization + each key rotation Use a Yubikey USB token
Target Repository admin issue delegation keys Initialization + each key rotation Delete after initialization/key rotation
Delegation SignPath individual images and labels Each image build Use one delegation key for all developers
Snapshot Notary signer sign matching collections to prove consistency Each image build (Registry/Notary take care of this)
Timestamp Notary signer sign current collections to prove “freshness” Constantly (Registry/Notary take care of this)

Setup overview

The process to set up SignPath for DCT is as follows:

  • Create a single delegation key in SignPath using the HSM store (e.g. one per Registry)
  • For each repository
    1. execute Initialize-DockerSigning, which
      • creates a root key for your repository (preferably using a Yubikey token)
      • creates a target key
      • adds the delegation key to the target key
      • registers the root key with Notary (results in new snapshot and timestamp keys created on Notary signer)
    2. delete the target key’s private key (recommended; no need to add more delegates later, but you can always perform a key rotation)
    3. lock the token with the root key in a safe (you will not need it again unless you need to do a key rotation)
    4. set up repository, project and signing policy in SignPath

Step-by-step instructions are available in the setup phase section.

As a result of this procedure, all remaining keys will be on secure systems:

Key type Physical protection Access control
Root Yubikey Locked in safe + PIN
Target (deleted) n/a
Delegation SignPath HSM SignPath policies
Snapshot (depends on Notary setup) Notary/Registry credentials
Timestamp (depends on Notary setup) Notary/Registry credentials

Future versions of SignPath will include root key management.

Signing overview

Execute Invoke-DockerSigning in your CI system, or call each step individually. See signing phase for step-by-step instructions.

Security considerations

The following table lists

  • the potential security impact in case a key is compromised (i.e. an adversary managed to retrieve or use the private key)
  • the recovery procedure in case a key is compromised or simply lost

(Some of the impact scenarios also require access to Notary/Registry credentials. See Notary threat model for a full breakdown.)

Key type Security impact Recovery procedure
Root illegitimate images signed, illegitimate keys issued Manual recovery for repository and all clients
Target illegitimate images signed, illegitimate delegate keys issued Key rotation
Delegate illegitimate images signed Key rotation
Snapshot mix-and-match attack Key rotation
Timestamp legitimate images wrongly declared current (freeze attack) Key rotation
The misleading security assumption of Notary and Docker Content Trust (DCT)

TL;DR: a single compromised delegation key will compromise all image repositories that trust this delegation.

Update: The Notary documentation is no longer hosted on docker.com. The implicit promise that Notary’s threat model also works for Docker Content Trust is no longer made. This section will soon be updated to reflect the new structure of Docker’s documentation. The Notary documentation is currently not published but available at GitHub.

Docker Content Trust (DCT) builds on the Notary signing system. While Notary was basically built for DCT, this does not necessarily mean that the two systems are well aligned. A frequent cause of confusion is that the Notary documentation is hosted on docs.docker.com/notary, which easily leads to the assumption that everything there also applies to DCT. This is not always true.

Notary has a well-defined threat model which states the following about compromised delegation keys:

An attacker can add malicious content, remove legitimate content from a collection, and mix up the targets in a collection, but only within the particular delegation roles that the key can sign for. Depending on the restrictions on that role, they may be restricted in what type of content they can modify. [Our emphasis]

This is the most important part of the threat model, since it involves the least protected keys. However, DCT uses Notary in a way that provides no such restriction. While DCT does provide the usual per-delegation signature manifests, its primary source of trust is a shared signature manifest called releases.json that includes all signatures from all delegates.

When verifying signatures, Docker only looks at this shared manifest, and thereby invalidates the separation of delegates provided by Notary. This essentially means that everybody who holds any delegation key can add signatures for images and labels, and change existing signature entries from other delegates.

Note that developers usually own a single delegation key that is trusted by many repositories. Issuing seperate delegation keys for each repository is not a good solution, it just puts an additional burden on developers to keep their keys secure, thus increasing the risks. Also, DCT does not support hardware tokens for delegation keys.

(Disclaimer: all compromise scenarios for delegation keys assume access to the developer’s Notary credentials, which are usually the same as their Docker registry credentials.)

Setup phase

Prerequisites

Required components:

  • PowerShell 6 or higher
  • SignPathDocker PowerShell module
  • Notary client version 0.6.1 or greater (installed with Docker Desktop until v3.3.3)

Optional components:

  • Attached Yubikey USB token (strongly recommended)

Steps

1. Create a new self-signed X.509 certificate in SignPath

This certificate will be added as a delegation key to your Docker repository in a later step.

You only need one delegation key, it can be shared between repositories.

2. Get or create the root and target keys

In order for SignPath to ensure that only valid tags can be signed, you need to upload the repository’s root key (only the public key) to SignPath. Use the SignPathDocker PowerShell module.

PowerShell parameters and FQN

Get-RootCertificate, Initialize-DockerSigning, and Add-DelegationCertificate accept the following parameters:

Parameter Description
Repository The FQN provided when creating the Docker repository in SignPath
NotaryUsername and NotaryPassword The credentials of your Notary server. In most cases, these are the same as the credentials for your Docker registry.
NotaryUrl Optional parameter to specify the URL of your internal notary server. Defaults to notary.docker.io which is the Notary server used by Docker Hub.

Fully qualified name (FQN)

For images hosted on Docker Hub, the FQN is docker.io/<namespace>/<repository>, e.g. docker.io/jetbrains/teamcity-server.

If you are using your own registry, specify the value you would use for Docker CLI commands, but without tag or digest values. E.g. when using docker pull myreg.jfrog.io/myrepo/myimage:latest, the FQN would be myreg.jfrog.io/myrepo/myimage.

Choose one of the following scenarios:

Scenario 1: You are currently not signing your Docker images

Call the following command:

Initialize-DockerSigning -Repository $FQN `
  -NotaryUsername $NOTARY_USERNAME -NotaryPassword $NOTARY_PASSWORD [-NotaryUrl $NOTARY_URL]

Executing this command will

  • create all necessary keys, prompting for passphrases during execution
    • root key (file or, preferably, Yubikey token)
    • target key (file)
    • snapshot key (temporary)
  • rotate the snapshot key (new key issued and maintained by Notary signer)
  • publish the trust data to the Notary server
  • extract the public part of the root key as a certificate file

The command prints the path of the certificate you need to upload in step 4.

Scenario 2: You are already signing your Docker images

If you already have an existing set of keys that you want to keep, you only need to export the public part of the root key for uploading to SignPath.

You can export the public key by calling the following command on the machine where the root and targets keys are stored:

Get-RootCertificate -Repository $FQN `
  -NotaryUsername $NOTARY_USERNAME -NotaryPassword $NOTARY_PASSWORD [-NotaryUrl $NOTARY_URL]

The command prints the path of the certificate you need to upload in step 4.

We recommend that you remove existing delegation keys as soon as you have verified that your SignPath setup works. Use the notary delegation remove command or perform a key rotation.

3. Add the delegation certificate to your repository’s delegation keys

Download the delegation key certificate file from step 1. Add it using the following command:

Add-DelegationCertificate -Repository $FQN `
  [-NotaryUrl $NOTARY_URL] [-NotaryUsername $NOTARY_USERNAME] [-NotaryPassword $NOTARY_PASSWORD] `
  -DelegationCertificatePath certificate.cer 

This adds a delegation (default name signpath) with the key from the specified certificate and publishes the changes to the Notary server. You will be prompted for the password of your targets key.

4. Set up a Docker repository and project in SignPath

  • Add a new Docker repository in SignPath
    • specify its fully qualified name (FQN)
    • upload the root certificate file from step 2
  • Create a project with an artifact configuration of type Docker signing data for this repository
  • Add a signing policy to the project
    • choose the certificate you created in step 1
    • add at least one CI user as a submitter

5. When everything works, delete the target key

Delete the file ~/.docker/trust/private/$id*.key where $id is the 7 digit key of the target key you created in step 2. See the Notary documenation.

We recommend to perform a test signing before deleting the target key.

Delete the target key: reason and consequences

DCT and Notary provide no method to protect the target key beyond a simple passphrase. Yubikey tokens can only be used for the root key. However, since SignPath uses only a single delegation key for all developers and CI systems, there is usually no need to for the target key after the setup phase. We therefore recommend that you delete the key file right after sucessfull initialization.

If you run into unexpected problems later that require a target key, you can always create a new one by performing a key rotation. Don’t forget to add existing delegation keys you want to keep after a key rotation.

The default expiration time for both target and delegation keys is 3 years. After this time, you need to perform a key rotation in any case.

Signing phase

Prerequisites

Required components:

The unsigned image must be

  • available on the local computer (preferably right after building it)
  • and pushed to the registry (unsigned)

Execution

Single-step signing

For convenience, the SignPathDocker module provides a single command to sign a Docker image:

Invoke-DockerSigning -Repository $FQN -Tags $TAGS `
  -CIUserToken $CI_USER_TOKEN -OrganizationId $ORGANIZATION_ID `
  -ProjectSlug $PROJECT_SLUG -SigningPolicySlug $SIGNING_POLICY_SLUG `
  [-ArtifactConfigurationSlug $ARTIFACT_CONFIGURATION_SLUG] [-Description $DESCRIPTION] `
  [-NotaryUrl $NOTARY_URL] [-NotaryUsername $NOTARY_USERNAME] [-NotaryPassword $NOTARY_PASSWORD] `
  [-RegistryUrl $REGISTRY_URL] [-RegistryUsername $REGISTRY_USERNAME] [-RegistryPassword $REGISTRY_PASSWORD]

Perform each step separately

Alternatively, you perform each step separately. Reasons to do this include

  • create multiple signatures with a single signing request
  • perform asynchronous signing, e.g. to accommodate for a manual approval step
# Create a Docker signing data file containing all metadata required for signing
New-DockerSigningData -Repository $FQN -Tags $TAGS `
  [-RegistryUrl $REGISTRY_URL] [-RegistryUsername $REGISTRY_USERNAME] [-RegistryPassword $REGISTRY_PASSWORD] `
  -OutputArtifactPath $ZIP_FILE

# Submit a new signing request to SignPath.
$signingRequestId = Submit-SigningRequest -InputArtifactPath $ZIP_FILE `
  -CIUserToken $CI_USER_TOKEN -OrganizationId $ORGANIZATION_ID `
  -ProjectSlug $PROJECT_SLUG -SigningPolicySlug $SIGNING_POLICY_SLUG 

# Get the signed artifact
Get-SignedArtifact $signingRequestId -CIUserToken $CI_USER_TOKEN -OrganizationId $ORGANIZATION_ID 

# Upload the signed metadata to the Notary server
Push-SignedDockerSigningData -Repository $FQN -InputArtifactPath $ZIP_FILE `
  [-NotaryUrl $NOTARY_URL] [-NotaryUsername $NOTARY_USERNAME] [-NotaryPassword $NOTARY_PASSWORD]
PowerShell parameters

Invoke-DockerSigning, New-DockerSigningData, Submit-SigningRequest, and Push-SignedDockerSigningData accept all or some of the following parameters:

Parameter Description
Repository The FQN provided when creating the Docker repository in SignPath
Tags A comma-separated list of Docker tags that you want to sign (e.g. v1,1.2.17)
CIUserToken The API token of the CI user (see build system integration)
OrganizationId ID of your SignPath organization
ProjectSlug, SigningPolicySlug and ArtifactConfigurationSlug The respective project, signing policy and artifact configuration for your signing request
Description Optional description for your signing request (e.g. version number)
NotaryUsername and NotaryPassword The credentials of your Notary server. In most cases, these are the same as the credentials for your Docker registry. If specified, overrides values in the NOTARY_AUTH environment variable. NotaryPassword is a PowerShell SecureString.
RegistryUsername and RegistryPassword The credentials of your Docker registry. If specified, overrides values in the REGISTRY_AUTH environment variable. RegistryPassword is a PowerShell SecureString.
RegistryUrl and NotaryUrl Optional parameter to specify the URLs of your internal registry and notary server. Defaults to docker.io (Docker Hub) and notary.docker.io (Notary of Docker Hub)

Passing SecureString parameters

Use the following syntax to create SecureString objects for the -NotaryPassword and -RegistryPassword parameters:

$SECURE_PASSWORD = ConvertTo-SecureString $PLAINTEXT_PASSWORD -AsPlainText 

Using environment variables for authentication

If you would rather provide credentials via environment variables, username and password have to be concatenated with a colon :, encoded in base64 and stored in the REGISTRY_AUTH or NOTARY_AUTH environment variable respectively. See the Notary documentation.

WaitForCompletion option

Instead of calling Get-SignedArtifact separately, you may call Submit-SigningRequest with the -WaitForCompletion parameter. The Submit-SigningRequest command is described in build system integration.

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